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Abstract: We consider methods for aggregating preferences that are based on
the resolution of discrete optimization problems. The preferences are represented by
arbitrary binary relations (possibly weighted) or incomplete paired comparison matrices.
This incomplete case remains practically unexplored so far. We examine the properties
of several known methods and propose one new method. In particular, we test whether
these methods obey a new axiom referred to here as Self-Consistent Monotonicity. Some
results are established that characterize solutions of the related optimization problems.
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1 Introduction
We consider methods for aggregating preferences that are based on the resolution
of discrete optimization problems. For a review and references see Cook and Kress
(1992), and Belkin and Levin (1990), and also David (1988) and Van Blokland-
Vogelesang (1991). Some algorithmic aspects can be found in Barthe´lemy (1989)
and Litvak (1982). The preferences are represented by arbitrary binary relations
(possibly weighted) or incomplete paired comparison matrices. The outcome of an
aggregation method is a set of “optimal” rankings (linear or weak orders) of the
alternatives. Namely, a ranking is said to be optimal if it provides an extremum
of some chosen objective function that expresses the connection (or proximity)
between an arbitrary ranking and the original preferences. One special feature
of the aggregation problem with incomplete preferences is that the Borda-like
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score is not any more a good rating index, since it does not take into account the
number of comparisons and the strength of “opponents” of each alternative. The
incomplete case remains practically unexplored so far. In this paper, we present
some initial results concerning this problem.
We examine the properties of several known methods formulated for the in-
complete case and propose one new method. In particular, we test whether these
methods obey a new axiom, referred to as Self-Consistent Monotonicity. Our re-
sults suggest that the methods under consideration hardly satisfy this condition
because of their discreteness. This paper provides only one example of meth-
ods satisfying Self-Consistent Monotonicity (Section 5). Actually, that method
is an indirect scoring procedure rather than an aggregating operator based on
discrete optimization. Indirect scoring procedures are considered in Chebotarev
and Shamis (1996), where a sufficient condition of Self-Consistent Monotonicity
and some more positive examples are given. A discussion of some other axioms
for aggregating incomplete preferences can be found in Chebotarev and Shamis
(1994).
2 An illustrative example and the aims of the
paper
We start with a simple example. Let there be four candidates and two voters.
The preferences of these voters are incomplete. Namely, the first voter says: “X2
and X3 are better than X4, and I know nothing about X1.” (Fig. 1 a.) The second
voter says: “X1 is better than X3, and I know nothing about X2 and X4.” (Fig.
1 b.)
Certainly, these preferences are extremely poor, and it is difficult to make a
decision based on them. Nevertheless, having in mind more lifelike situations,
we may pose a question: Which principles should be followed when aggregating
incomplete preferences. Every answer will imply some consequences applicable to
complete preferences as well.
Obviously, in this example X1 or X2 should be the first. We believe that X1
has a small advantage over X2, since X1 defeats a “stronger” opponent. The rank
order of the other candidates is more clear: X2 ≻ X3 ≻ X4.
Our main requirement to the aggregating operators comes down to the follow-
ing. Suppose we consider two alternatives, and the first alternative as compared
to the second one
– achieves the better scores against the “stronger” opponents or
– achieves the better scores against the opponents of the same “strengths” or
– achieves the same scores against the “stronger” opponents.
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Figure 1. Preferences of two voters
Then the first alternative should be placed higher than the second one in the
social ranking.
Now we have to explain what is meant by “stronger”. In the above require-
ment, “stronger” signifies “is placed higher in the social ranking that is mentioned
in the requirement.” This requirement is formalized in Section 7 and is referred to
as Self-Consistency. To obtain Self-Consistent Monotonicity, the main axiom in
this paper, we require that if the first alternative additionally achieves some extra
“wins” and/or the second alternative has extra “losses”, then the first alternative
should remain higher than the second one in the social ranking.
It turns out that very few methods satisfy these natural axioms. In this paper,
we adjust a number of discrete optimization procedures to the case of incomplete
preferences. The most familiar are the close procedures by Kemeny (1959) and
Slater (1961) (their idea has been initially suggested by Kendall (1955)). For
instance, the Slater method minimizes the number of arcs (which designate in-
dividual binary preferences) directed upwards (from a “worse” alternative to a
“better” one) in the social ranking. When applied to the above example, this
method produces three optimal social rankings (with no upward arcs), namely,
X1 ≻ X2 ≻ X3 ≻ X4, X2 ≻ X1 ≻ X3 ≻ X4, and X1 ≻ X3 ≻ X2 ≻ X4. Only the
first of them preserves Self-Consistent Monotonicity.
The aims of this paper are:
– to collect some discrete optimization methods, to represent them in the assign-
ment-like form (Section 4), and to define their modifications that generate weak
orders (Section 9);
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– to give some results characterizing solutions of these optimization problems
(Section 6);
– to introduce Self-Consistent Monotonicity (Section 7);
– to present some necessary conditions of Self-Consistent Monotonicity (Sections
8 and 10);
– to prove Self-Consistent Monotonicity for the generalized row sum method and
to test discrete optimization methods in this respect (Sections 8, 10, and 11);
– to outline the difficulties in obeying Self-Consistent Monotonicity by discrete
optimization methods (Section 11).
3 Notation
The case of incomplete and possibly weighted preferences requires some more
complex notation. Let X = {X1, . . . , Xn} be a set of alternatives to be compared.
To represent arbitrary preference relations of individuals, both ordinary binary
relations and weighted ones, we use incomplete paired comparison matrices. Such a
matrix of the pth individual (p = 1, . . . , m) is an n×n table R(p) = (rpij)
n
i,j=1 whose
entries rpij and r
p
ji represent the result of comparing Xi to Xj by this individual.
The ordered pair (rpij , r
p
ji) will be called the outcome of that comparison. Here the
value of rpij can be interpreted as a measure of advantage of Xi over Xj (something
like the number of scored goals in sport). If Xi and Xj have not been compared
by that individual, the two corresponding cells of the table remain empty (i.e., rpij
and rpji are undefined). The diagonal elements r
p
ii (i = 1, . . . , n) do not correspond
to any comparisons and are defined according to some convention. The collection
of matrices R = (R(1), . . . , R(m)) is called an array of paired comparisons of the
alternatives X1, . . . , Xn. If all R
(p) (p = 1, . . . , m) are completely defined, then R
is said to be complete.
Let R = (rij) be a complete n× n-matrix, where
rij =
∑
p|(i,j)
rpij, i, j = 1, . . . , n
with summation over p for which rpij is defined in R. If for every p, r
p
ij is undefined
in R(p), then, by definition, rij = 0. The total number of comparisons between Xi
and Xj 6= Xi will be denoted by mij :
mij = |{p : r
p
ij is defined in R}|.
If i = j then mij = 0.
An aggregating operator is a mapping assigning to every R with fixed n ≥ 2
and m ≥ 1 a nonempty set of weak orders on X . These weak orders are called
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optimal. If an aggregating operator always generates only linear optimal orders,
we say that it is strict. Recall that a weak order is a complete and transitive binary
relation; a linear order is an antisymmetric weak order. W and L will denote the
set of all weak orders on X and the set of all linear orders on X , respectively.
These binary relations are considered here as those of preference, i.e., for such a
relation ρ, Xi ρXj means “Xi is not worse than Xj according to ρ.”
For any binary relation ρ on X and for every Xi ∈ X , the Copeland index of
Xi in ρ can be defined as follows:
ρ(Xi) = ρ(i) = ρ i = |{Xj ∈ X : Xi ρXj}| − |{Xj ∈ X : Xj ρXi}|. (1)
If ρ is a weak order, then ρ i > ρ j can be interpreted as “Xi is better than Xj
in ρ”. In this case we write Xi≻ρXj . If ρ is a weak order and ρ i = ρ j, we say that
Xi and Xj are tied in ρ and write Xi∼ρXj. The expression XiρXj denotes the
disjunction of Xi≻ρXj and Xi∼ρXj . Thus the Copeland index enables to extend
the notion of rank to weak orders (in the manner like that used in statistics).
Paired comparisons can be dichotomous (rpij ∈ {−1, 1} or r
p
ij ∈ {0, 1}), with
draws (rpij ∈ {−1, 0, 1} or r
p
ij ∈ {0,
1
2
, 1}), numerical, and so on; different con-
nections between rpij and r
p
ji can be imposed. In this paper, we consider in-
complete paired comparisons with the only connection between rpij and r
p
ji that
if rpij is defined in R, then r
p
ji is defined too. Let us suppose that there exist
rmin and rmax > rmin such that all entries r
p
ij must belong to the closed interval
[rmin, rmax]. An outcome (r
p
ij , r
p
ji) of comparing Xi to Xj will be called a maximal
win if rpij = rmax and r
p
ji = rmin; it will be called a maximal loss if r
p
ij = rmin and
rpji = rmax. As it has been mentioned above, we do not require that R consists
of only maximal wins and maximal losses, however our results are applicable to
the paired comparisons of that type as well. We only suppose that maximal wins
(maximal losses) are admissible. By definition, put rpii = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and p ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
Now we introduce the Copeland index t(Xi) of Xi in the array of paired com-
parisons R:
t(Xi) = ti =
∑
(j,p)|i
(rpij − r
p
ji) =
n∑
j=1
(rij − rji), (2)
where (j, p)|i denotes summation over j and p, for which rpij is defined in R.
Remark. This framework tolerates many diverse ways of extracting the num-
bers rpij from the individual perceptions. In this paper, we confine ourselves to the
data for which sums and differences (such as in the above formula) make sense.
This means that they are compatible with the scale type or are meaningful in
some other exact model. Below we examine the properties of different objective
functions based on these operations.
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4 Objective functions for aggregating
preferences
It can be easily shown that many known optimization methods for aggregating
preferences can be reduced to quadratic assignment problems of the form
QA(R,C) : maximize
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
rijC(ρ i, ρ j) for ρ ∈ P, (3)
where C(·, ·) is a fixed structure function, and ρ i is the Copeland index of Xi in
ρ. Now P is the set of all linear orders on X (i.e., P = L), but below a more
general case (P = W) is considered too. The quadratic assignment objective
function measures some multiplicative consistency (depending on C(·, ·)) between
the original preferences and a tentative resulting order ρ.
The formulation (3) of the quadratic assignment problem is not conventional.
We use the Copeland index of Xi in ρ instead of a simple rank (see, e.g., Hubert
(1976) and Arditti (1983)) since this straightforward generalization provides an
easy way to introduce weak quadratic assignment problems (WQA(R,C)) involv-
ing arbitrary weak orders (P =W) instead of linear orders on X .
As long as quadratic assignment problems with P = L, are considered, the
following structure functions are relevant:
C1(x, y) = sign(x−y), C2(x, y) = (sign(x−y))
(+), C3(x, y) = (sign(x−y))
(−),
C4(x, y) = x− y, C5(x, y) = (x− y)
(+), C6(x, y) = (x− y)
(−),
where z(+) = max(z, 0) , z(−) = min(z, 0), and
sign z =


−1, if z < 0,
0, if z = 0,
1, if z > 0.
Note that C1(x, y) = C2(x, y)+C3(x, y), C4(x, y) = C5(x, y)+C6(x, y), C2(x, y) =
sign(C5(x, y)), C3(x, y) = sign(C6(x, y)).
In the following list of objective functions (and of corresponding methods)
structure functions C1, . . . , C6 are used not only for quadratic assignment prob-
lems.
1. Three distinct extensions of the Slater (1961) method, which had been originally
suggested by Kendall (1955): QA(R,Ck), k ∈ {1, 2, 3} (see, e.g., Arditti (1983)).
2. Three distinct extensions of the Kemeny (1959) method (which is equivalent
to the Slater method in the complete dichotomous case):
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minimize
∑
(i,j,p)|R
|rpij − Ck(ρ i, ρ j)| for ρ ∈ P
with k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and summation over those i, j, p for which rpij is defined in R.
According to Young (1986), Kemeny’s method had been initially proposed in a
vague form by Condorcet.
3. “Weighted sum of back scores”: QA(R,C6). This method was suggested by
Thompson (1975) and Hubert (1976), and studied in Kano and Sakamoto (1985),
and Frey and Yehia-Alcoutlabi (1986).
4. “Weighted sum of right scores”: QA(R,C5) (Kano and Sakamoto (1983)).
5. “Weighted sum of all scores”: QA(R,C4) (Chebotarev (1988, 1990), Crow
(1990)). This method can be reduced to ordering alternatives by “sum of wins
minus sum of losses” (it is the Copeland index; see Theorem 1 below) and is
connected to some ideas of Kendall (1970).
6. “Net sum of back scores” (see, e.g., Weiss and Assous (1987), Crow (1990))
QA((R− RT )(+), C3):
maximize
n∑
i=1
∑
j:m
ij
>0
(rij − rji)
(+)C3(ρ i, ρ j) for ρ ∈ P .
7. The following four methods are based on the idea of balancing “back scores”
of two types: “wins above” and “losses below” (Crow (1990, 1993)).
7a. Sum of absolute differences between Wins Above and Losses Below – “WALB”:
minimize
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣ n∑
j=1
(rijC3(ρ i, ρ j)− rjiC3(ρ j, ρ i))
∣∣∣ for ρ ∈ P .
7b. “Refined WALB”:
minimize
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣ ∑
j:m
ij
>0
1
m
ij
(rijC3(ρ i, ρ j)− rjiC3(ρ j, ρ i))
∣∣∣ for ρ ∈ P .
7c. “Net WALB”:
minimize
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣ ∑
j:m
ij
>0
((rij − rji)
(+)C3(ρ i, ρ j)− (rji − rij)
(+)C3(ρ j, ρ i))
∣∣∣ for ρ ∈ P .
7d. “Refined Net WALB”:
minimize
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣ ∑
j:m
ij
>0
1
m
ij
((rij−rji)
(+)C3(ρ i, ρ j)−(rji−rij)
(+)C3(ρ j, ρ i))
∣∣∣ for ρ ∈ P .
7e. “Net-Difference-WALB”:
minimize
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣ ∑
j:m
ij
>0
((rij − rji)
(+)C6(ρ i, ρ j)− (rji − rij)
(+)C6(ρ j, ρ i))
∣∣∣ for ρ ∈ P .
The following method is new.
8. “β-Least-Squares” (β-LS): minimize
∑
(i,j,p)|R
(rpij − βC4(ρ i, ρ j))
2 for ρ ∈ P
with summation over those i, j, p for which rpij is defined in R. Here β is a positive
real parameter.
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Remark. In the methods based on “net scores” (i.e., “Net sum of back scores”,
“Net WALB”, “Refined Net WALB”, and “Net-Difference-WALB”) a “net draw”
(mij > 0, rij = rji) between two alternatives with different positions in ρ (ρ i 6=
ρ j) is worth being distinguished from the lack of comparisons between them
(mij = 0, where rij = rji by definition). If only maximal wins/losses are allowed,
then the following modification provides this distinction: replace (rij −rji)
(+) by
ψ(rij −rji), where
ψ(z) =


z, if z > 0,
(rmax − rmin)/2, if z = 0,
0, if z < 0,
as Crow (1990, 1993) proposes for the case rmax = 1, rmin = 0. Note that such a
modification preserves our results that involve these methods, i.e., Corollary 1 and
Theorem 6 below. Another possible modification based on the function ψ′(z) =
(z+ rmax− rmin)
(+) preserves Corollary 1 and Theorem 6 as well. Above we wrote
j : mij > 0 under the second sums in the objective functions of the “Net”-methods
in order to support these possible modifications.
Some other methods can be obtained by extending the measures of association
from Critchlow (1985) to incomplete paired comparisons.
5 Generalized row sum method
The generalized row sum method (Chebotarev (1989, 1994)) is not based on the
resolution of a discrete optimization problem, however it has some connection
with the β-LS method (Theorem 3 below). On the other hand, the generalized
row sum method will be shown to satisfy Self-Consistent Monotonicity, the main
axiom in this paper (Theorem 8).
For the sake of simplicity, we suppose here that incomplete paired comparison
matrices R(p), p = 1, . . . , m, are skew-symmetric: if rpij is defined in R
(p), then
rpji = −r
p
ij . In this case, rmin = −rmax. The generalized row sum method estimates
the alternatives by the indexes x1, . . . , xn (generalized row sums) that satisfy the
following system of linear equations:
xi =
∑
(k,p)|i
(rpik + ε ·(xk−xi+r
p
ikmn)), i = 1, . . . , n, (4)
where ε is a nonnegative parameter. This system of equations has been proven to
have a unique solution for every R . The corresponding optimal weak order ρ is
defined as follows: Xi≻ρXj iff xi > xj .
The generalized row sum method is an extension of the row sum method (and
of the Borda rule in the case where individual preferences are linear orders) to
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incomplete paired comparisons. Specifically, if R is complete, then for any ε ≥ 0,
xi = si (i = 1, . . . , n) holds, where
si =
∑
(k,p)|i
rpik = ti /2.
This method has been derived both axiomatically and statistically. The value
f pik = r
p
ik + ε ·(xk−xi+r
p
ikmn) is the contribution of the comparison outcome r
p
ik
to the estimate xi of Xi. Parameter ε ≥ 0 is said to be reasonable for given n and
m if for any array R that consists of m n-by-n paired comparison matrices, the
value
f pik = r
p
ik + ε ·(xk−xi+r
p
ikmn)
is non-negative at rpik = rmax (maximal win) and non-positive at r
p
ik = rmin =
−rmax (maximal loss), for any i, j, and p.
It has been shown that the reasonableness of ε is equivalent to satisfying the
constraint
0 ≤ ε ≤
1
m(n− 2)
.
6 Some connections to direct methods
In this section, we prove three theorems concerning connections between discrete
optimization methods, namely QA(R,C4) and β-LS, and direct methods for ag-
gregating preferences. The first two theorems are formulated for the general case
of weak orders (P = W). Theorem 1 shows that the method QA(R,C4) can be
reduced to ordering alternatives in the decreasing order of their Copeland indexes
(with an arbitrary order of the alternatives having the same Copeland index).
Note that the related problems QA(R,C5) and QA(R,C6) are, in general, NP-
complete.
Theorem 1 (Reduction of WQA(R,C4) to the Copeland ranking): A weak order
ρ is a solution of WQA(R,C4) for R if and only if
for any Xi, Xj ∈ X , ti > tj implies Xi≻ρXj. (5)
The proofs of all statements are given in the Appendix. An analogous theorem
for linear orders has been proved in Chebotarev (1988, 1990).
A similar statement holds for the β-LS method with small enough β.
Theorem 2 (Partial reduction of β-LS with small β to the Copeland ranking):
Let R be an array of paired comparisons on X . There exists a number β0 > 0
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such that: if 0 < β < β0, then every solution ρ
∗ ∈ W of the β-LS problem with
parameter β for R satisfies the following condition:
for any Xi, Xj ∈ X , ti > tj implies Xi ≻ρ∗ Xj. (6)
There is an important difference between the methods QA(R,C4) and β-LS
with a small β. Namely, according to Theorem 2, (6) is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition of optimality. In other words, the latter method does not
permit arbitrariness in ordering the alternatives with the same Copeland index.
Indeed, it can be easily shown by examples that β-LS with a small parameter may
yield a narrower set of optimal orders than QA(R,C4).
Now consider a continuous counterpart of the β-Least-Squares method. Note
that for any linear order ρ on X ,
n∑
i=1
ρ i = 0 and
n∑
i=1
(ρ i)2 = 1
3
(n − 1)n(n + 1).
Denote the latter value by D2n and consider the following relaxed β-LS method:
minimize
∑
(i,j,p)|R
(rpij − β(yi − yj))
2 for real y1, . . . , yn (7)
subject to
n∑
i=1
yi = 0 (8)
and n∑
i=1
y2i = D
2
n. (9)
The difference between β-LS and relaxed β-LS is that for the former problem
the set of admissible solutions is narrower: not the whole intersection of the
hyperplane
n∑
i=1
yi = 0 with the hypersphere
n∑
i=1
y2i = D
2
n, but the set of points
obtained from (−(n − 1),−(n − 3), . . . , (n − 1)) by all possible permutations of
the coordinates. These points are all vertices of a specific polyhedron (polytope)
inscribed into that intersection. According to the following theorem, relaxed β-LS
is closely connected to the generalized row sum method.
Theorem 3 (Reduction of the relaxed β-LS to the generalized row sums): Let
y = (y1, . . . , yn) be a solution of the relaxed β-LS problem with some β for an
array of paired comparisons R = (r
p
ij)
p∈{1,...,m}
i,j∈{1,...,n}. Let R
′ be an array of paired
comparisons with elements (rpij)
′ = rpij − r
p
ji. Then for some ε, the vector y is
proportional to the vector of generalized row sums obtained with parameter ε for
R′.
Another example of Lagrangian relaxation applied to a discrete preference
aggregation problem can be found in Arditti (1983).
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7 Self-Consistency and Self-Consistent
Monotonicity
H.A. David (1987) said “...nonparametric method cannot be entirely satisfactory
when the mij differ greatly.” Our aim is to investigate to what extent such a
method can be satisfactory, and so we examine the properties of the methods
above. In this section, a new axiom named Self-Consistency and its extension,
Self-Consistent Monotonicity are introduced.
Let us say that an outcome (rpik, r
p
ki) of comparing Xi to Xk is not weaker with
respect to a weak order ρ than an outcome (rqjℓ, r
q
ℓj) of comparing Xj to Xℓ iff
rpik ≥ r
q
jℓ, r
p
ki ≤ r
q
ℓj, and Xk ρXℓ. If, in addition, at least one of the inequalities
(relations) is strict, then the outcome (rpik, r
p
ki) is said to be stronger than (r
q
jℓ, r
q
ℓj)
with respect to ρ.
Self-Consistency. For any optimal weak order ρ and for any Xi, Xj ∈ X ,
the statement [There exists a one-to-one correspondence between the set of com-
parison outcomes of Xi and the set of comparison outcomes of Xj such that each
outcome of Xi is not weaker than the corresponding outcome of Xj with respect
to ρ] implies [XiρXj]. If, in addition, at least one outcome of Xi is stronger
than the corresponding outcome of Xj with respect to ρ, then Xi≻ρXj.
Self-Consistency enables us to confront two alternatives having the same num-
ber of comparisons. Now suppose that the alternative dominating in such a con-
frontation achieves several extra maximal wins and the dominated alternative gets
some number of extra maximal losses. It is reasonable to demand that this addi-
tion of extra outcomes preserves the result of confrontation: the former alternative
remains “better”. Let us extend Self-Consistency in this way.
Self-Consistent Monotonicity (SCM). Suppose ρ is an optimal weak order
and Xi, Xj ∈ X . Let Ri and Rj be the sets of comparison outcomes of Xi and
Xj , respectively. Suppose that Ri = R
′
i ∪R
′′
i (Ri ∩R
′′
i = ∅), Rj = R
′
j ∪R
′′
j
(Rj ∩R
′′
j = ∅), R
′′
i consists of maximal wins, R
′′
j consists of maximal losses, and
there exists a one-to-one correspondence between R′i and R
′
j (in particular, R
′
i
and R′j may be empty) such that every outcome from R
′
i is not weaker than the
corresponding outcome from R′j with respect to ρ. Then XiρXj . If, in addition,
at least one outcome from R′i is stronger than the corresponding outcome from
R′j with respect to ρ or R
′′
i 6= ∅ or R
′′
j 6= ∅, then Xi≻ρXj .
Possibly, some analysts can be inclined to consider the entire set of optimal
orders as an indivisible macro-decision whose elements represent different charac-
teristic features of the set of original preferences. From this point of view, optimal
orders should be considered not separately but jointly, and Self-Consistency which
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addresses to every separate optimal order is a surplus requirement. A possible ob-
jection to this opinion is as follows. In most situations we have to make only one
decision. As soon as it is made, any appealing to other optimal decisions becomes
out of place. The decision we make should be logical by itself, apart from rejected
opportunities.
8 All strict operators break Self-Consistency
Recall that an aggregating operator is strict if its optimal orders are always linear.
Theorem 4: If an aggregating operator is strict, then it does not satisfy Self-
Consistency.
This theorem has an easy but somewhat degenerate proof. Indeed, note that
Self-Consistency does not prohibit the sets of comparison outcomes of Xi and Xj
to be empty. In this case, Self-Consistency impliesXiρXj andXj ρXi, which is
broken by any linear order. A similar proof with alternatives that have nonempty
sets of comparisons and n > 2 can be carried out by considering the following
R: r113 = r
1
23 = rmax, r
1
31 = r
1
32 = rmin; all other r
p
ij with i 6= j are undefined.
In the Appendix we give another proof, which demonstrates the application of
Self-Consistency to cyclic preferences.
9 Operators generating weak orders
Theorem 4 motivates the consideration of aggregating operators that generate not
only linear orders but arbitrary weak orders. In particular, we shall consider weak
quadratic assignment problems WQA(R,C), i.e., problems (3) with P =W (note
that Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 have been formulated for this general case).
To that end it is useful to modify structure functions C2, C3, C4, and C6.
Indeed, note that the structure functions C1(x, y), . . . , C6(x, y) depend on x − y.
Suppose g(d) is the contribution of the comparison outcome (rpij = rmax, r
p
ji =
rmin) to the quadratic assignment objective function, provided that ρ i− ρ j = d.
Then, by (3), g(d) = rmaxC(d, 0) + rminC(0, d). It is reasonable to require
g(−1) < g(0) < g(1). (10)
Indeed, since the quadratic assignment objective function measures consistency
between the original preferences and a tentative resulting order, this requirement
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is motivated by that maximal win is more natural for alternatives with higher
social estimate.
For C1 and C4, (10) amounts to rmax > rmin, whereas for C2, C3, C5, and C6
it is equivalent to [rmax > 0 and rmin < 0]. Therefore (10) is broken even for the
customary sporting point systems: rpij ∈ {0,
1
2
, 1} and rpij ∈ {0, 1, 2}. As a result,
for these point systems, the weak order in which all alternatives are tied is never
optimal for QA(R,C2) and QA(R,C5), and is always optimal for QA(R,C3) and
QA(R,C6).
Thus let us revise C2, C3, C5, and C6 as follows:
C ′2(x, y) = sign(x− y) + 1, C
′
3(x, y) = sign(x− y)− 1,
C ′5(x, y) = (x− y + 1)
(+), C ′6(x, y) = (x− y − 1)
(−).
C1 and C4 do not require revisions: let C
′
1(x, y) = C1(x, y), C
′
4(x, y) =
C4(x, y).
For all these functions, (10) amounts to rmax > rmin, and they are equivalent
to their prototypes in all optimization methods of Section 4 in the strict case.
In the rest of the paper, we consider quadratic assignment problems and other
problems of Section 4 with C ′k substituted for Ck (k ∈ {1, . . . , 6}) and P =W.
10 Indifference to the degree of resulting
preferences contradicts SCM
Let us say that an aggregating operator equalizes weak orders ρ and ρ′ for R if ρ
and ρ′ are both optimal for R or both are not optimal. An aggregating operator
will be called indifferent to the degree of resulting preferences if it equalizes every
ρ and ρ′ such that
for all rpij defined in R, sign(ρ i− ρ j) = sign(ρ
′ i− ρ′ j).
Theorem 5: If a nonstrict aggregating operator is indifferent to the degree of
resulting preferences and n > 2, then it violates SCM.
Corollary 1: The nonstrict aggregating operators corresponding to:
WQA(R,C ′k), k ∈ {1, 2, 3}; minimize
∑
(i,j,p)| R
|rpij − C
′
k(ρ i, ρ j)| for ρ ∈ W , k ∈
{1, 2, 3} (extensions of the Kemeny median); “Net sum of back scores”, “WALB”,
“Net WALB”, “Refined WALB”, and “Refined Net WALB” violate SCM.
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11 Are there discrete optimization methods
that obey Self-Consistent Monotonicity?
Theorem 6: If n > 2, then the nonstrict aggregating operators corresponding to
WQA(R,C ′k) with k ∈ {4, 5, 6} and “Net-Difference-WALB” violate SCM.
The claim that the β-LS operator satisfies SCM might provide a “happy end”
of this paper. However, this is not the case.
Theorem 7: If n > 4 then the β-LS operator violates Self-Consistency for any
β > 0.
Recall that the β-LS method can be considered as a discrete analog of the
generalized row sum method (Theorem 3).
Theorem 8: The generalized row sum method with positive ε satisfies Self-
Consistency. Moreover, it satisfies Self-Consistent Monotonicity when ε is positive
and reasonable.
Comparison of Theorem 7 and Theorem 8 suggests that the β-LS method
fails to satisfy Self-Consistency because of its discreteness. Indeed, in the proof
of Theorem 7 given in the Appendix, X1 has a small superiority over X2 in the
original preferences, and Self-Consistency requires X1≻ρX2. However, β-LS ties
X1 and X2 for every n > 5. Note that β-LS minimizes some kind of proximity
between the initial preferences and the tested weak orders. The superiority of X1
over X2 turns out to be so small that it is closer to “draw” than to “win”. This
is typical of nonstrict discrete methods like β-LS. There are only three possible
relations between two alternatives in a social weak order, “worse”, “better”, and
“equivalent”, and the latter turns out to be optimal for small superiorities under
the nonstrict aggregating procedures. Is this a shortcoming or not? We believe
that in case we must choose only one alternative, even a small superiority is
worth being taken into account, and so such a tie is not useful. An advantage of
continuous approaches is that they enable one to measure the differences between
the adjacent alternatives, whereas the discrete methods give no means for that.
(However, some information can be extracted through comparing the optimal
value of the objective function with its values for orders where these alternatives
are tied or interchanged.)
All the discrete optimization methods we considered proved to break Self-
Consistent Monotonicity. Nevertheless, the question in the heading of this section
is a methodological rather than a mathematical one. Indeed, a discrete optimiza-
tion method that satisfies SCM can be designed artificially, for example, by using
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explicit expressions of the generalized row sums x1, . . . , xn:
maximize
n∑
i=1
(xi ρ i− α(ρ i)
2) for ρ ∈ W , (11)
where α is a small enough positive constant.
To prove that the optimal values ρ i are ordered exactly as xi, note that every
maximizing weak order for the objective function
n∑
i=1
xi ρ i preserves the strict
component of the order of x1, ..., xn (Lemma 1 in the proof of Theorem 1), and
the subtraction of α(ρ i)2 in (11) provides equal ρ i for the alternatives with equal
generalized row sums xi. (Indeed, equal numbers provide a minimum for the
sum of squares subject to their fixed sum.) It follows that aggregating operator
(11) satisfies SCM. However, such a method would remain essentially based on
“continuous” indexes. Now we do not know any proper discrete optimization
operators that satisfy SCM.
12 Conclusion
If an aggregating operator is strict, then it breaks Self-Consistent Monotonicity
(SCM), since this axiom prescribes equivalence of some alternatives (Theorem 4).
Many aggregating operators associated with discrete optimization problems are
“indifferent to the degree of resulting preferences”, which is incompatible with
SCM (Theorem 5). Nonstrict discrete optimization methods like β-LS violate
Self-Consistent Monotonicity, since they produce equivalence of some alternatives,
one of which having a small superiority over another. On the other hand, there
are “continuous” methods that satisfy SCM, for example, the generalized row sum
method (Theorem 8).
The transfer from linear orders to weak orders is the first step of relaxation.
Possibly, this step is not sufficient for such a keen type of data as unbalanced
(incomplete) preferences. A next possible step is the conversion to aggregation
models with real unknown parameters that measure the value (utility) of alterna-
tives. Such indirect scoring procedures are considered in Chebotarev and Shamis
(1996) where a sufficient condition of Self-Consistent Monotonicity and some more
positive examples are given.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose ρ is an arbitrary weak order on X , and f(ρ) is
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the value of the objective function for ρ. Then
f(ρ) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
rij(ρ i− ρ j) =
n∑
i=1

ρ i n∑
j=1
rij

− n∑
j=1
(
ρ j
n∑
i=1
rij
)
=
n∑
i=1
ρ i ti. (A1)
Now it suffices to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (A weak order maximizes scalar product iff it preserves relation “>”):
For any real vector u = (u1, . . . , un), a weak order ρ is a solution of the problem
maximize
n∑
i=1
ui ρ i for ρ ∈ W (A2)
if and only if
for any Xi, Xj ∈ X , ui > uj implies Xi≻ρXj . (A3)
Proof of Lemma 1: Let ρ be a solution of the problem (A2). Assume that
there exist Xk and Xℓ such that ui > uj, but ρ k ≤ ρ ℓ. Consider two cases.
(A) ρ k < ρ ℓ. Consider the weak order ρ′ that is obtained from ρ by inter-
changing Xk and Xℓ. Then, according to (A1),
f(ρ)− f(ρ′) =
n∑
i=1
(ρ i− ρ′ i)ui = (ρ k)uk+(ρ ℓ)uℓ−(ρ
′ k)uk−(ρ
′ ℓ)uℓ
= (ρ k)uk+(ρ ℓ)uℓ−(ρ ℓ)uk−(ρ k)uℓ = (ρ k − ρ ℓ)(uk−uℓ) < 0,
and ρ cannot be a solution of QA(R,C4), in contradiction to the assumption.
(B) ρ k = ρ ℓ. Let Xkℓ = {Xj : ρ j = ρ k} \ {Xk, Xℓ}. Recall that ρ is a
binary relation, i.e., Xv ρXw is a designation of (Xv, Xw) ∈ ρ. We shall “move
apart” Xk and Xℓ in ρ preserving the positions of all other alternatives. Consider
the weak order ρ′ that is obtained by removing from ρ the pair (Xℓ, Xk) and
the pairs (Xj , Xk) and (Xℓ, Xj) for all Xj ∈ Xkℓ. Then ρ
′ k = ρ k + | Xkℓ | + 1,
ρ′ ℓ = ρ ℓ− |Xkℓ | − 1, and ρ i
′ = ρ i for all Xi ∈ X \{Xk, Xℓ}. Hence, by (A1),
f(ρ)− f(ρ′) =
n∑
i=1
(ρ i− ρ′ i)ui = (−|Xkℓ | − 1)uk+(| Xkℓ |+ 1)uℓ
= (uℓ−uk)(| Xkℓ |+ 1) < 0,
and ρ cannot be a solution of QA(R,C4), in contradiction to our assumption.
Necessity of (A3) is shown.
To prove sufficiency of (A3), note that all weak orders satisfying (A3) can be
obtained one from another by sequential adding and removing pairs (Xk, Xℓ) such
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that uk = uℓ. Therefore, if for an arbitrary i we denote the set {Xj ∈ X : uj = ui}
by Xi, then the value
∑
Xj∈Xi
ρ j is the same for all weak orders satisfying (A3).
Consequently, all such weak orders have the same (and thus maximal!) value of
(A1). This completes the proof of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose ρ∗ satisfies (6) and let for any ρ
f(ρ) =
∑
(i,j,p)|R
(rpij − βC4(ρ i, ρ j))
2
=
∑
(i,j,p)|R
(rpij)
2 − 2β
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
rijC4(ρ i, ρ j) + β
2
∑
(i,j,p)|R
(ρ i− ρ j)2. (A4)
The second term in the right-hand side of (A4) corresponds to QA(R,C4). By
Theorem 1, there exists a number E > 0 such that for any ρ′ not satisfying (6),
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
rijC4(ρ
∗ i, ρ∗ j)−
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
rijC4(ρ
′ i, ρ′ j) > E.
Let F be an upper bound of
∑
(i,j,p)|R
(ρ i−ρ j)2 for all weak orders ρ on X . Then for
any β such that 0 < β < 2E
F
= β0 and for any ρ
′ not satisfying (6), f(ρ∗) > f(ρ′),
and ρ′ cannot be a solution. The theorem is proved.
Proof of Theorem 3: This proof is technical, and we give only a plan.
Searching the minimum (7) subject to (8) and (9) with the Lagrange multiplier
method, we get a system of n linear equations in y1, . . . , yn. Summing all of them,
we derive that the multiplier corresponding to (8) equals zero and then conclude
that this system of equations for some ε coincides with that of the generalized
row sum method. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4: This proof is very simple, however we give it in detail
in order to illustrate the application of Self-Consistency. Assume on the contrary
that there exists a strict aggregating operator that satisfies Self-Consistency.
1. Let n > 2. Consider the following array of paired comparisons R: r112 =
r123 = r
1
31 = rmax; r
1
21 = r
1
32 = r
1
13 = rmin; all other r
p
ij with i 6= j are undefined
(Figure A1).
Let ρ be a linear order on X in which X1≻ρX2 and X2≻ρX3. The set of
comparison outcomes of X1 is {(r
1
12 = rmax, r
1
21 = rmin), (r
1
13 = rmin, r
1
31 = rmax)};
the set of comparison outcomes ofX3 is {(r
1
31 = rmax, r
1
13 = rmin), (r
1
32 = rmin, r
1
23 =
rmax)}. Note that (r
1
31, r
1
13) is stronger than (r
1
12, r
1
21) with respect to ρ, since
X1≻ρX2, and (r
1
32, r
1
23) is stronger than (r
1
13, r
1
31) with respect to ρ, sinceX2≻ρX3.
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❜ ❜
❜ ❜ ❜
X1
X2
X3
X4 Xn· · ·
❳❳❳❳❳③
✑
✑
✑✑✰❇
❇
❇❇▼
R(1)
❜ ❜
❜ ❜ ❜
X1
X2
X3
X4 Xn· · ·
R(2) = · · · = R(m)
Figure A1. R = (R(1), . . . , R(m)) in the proof of Theorem 4: n > 2.
Every arc (Xi,Xj) designates that r
p
ij = rmax and r
p
ji = rmin.
Therefore X1≻ρX3 contradicts Self-Consistency, and ρ is not optimal. Arguing as
above we obtain that any linear order for whichX2≻ρX3≻ρX1 orX3≻ρX1≻ρX2
is not optimal. Now assumeX1≻ρX3 andX3≻ρX2. Let us compare the outcomes
of X2 and X1. Note that (r
1
23, r
1
32) is stronger than (r
1
12, r
1
12) with respect to ρ,
since X3≻ρX2 and (r
1
21, r
1
12) is stronger than (r
1
13, r
1
31), since X1≻ρX3. Therefore,
X1≻ρX2 contradicts Self-Consistency, and ρ is not optimal. In the same way we
conclude that if X2≻ρX1≻ρX3 or X3≻ρX2≻ρX1, then ρ is not optimal. Since
every linear order on X obeys one of the above six assumptions, we obtain that
the set of optimal orders is empty in contradiction to the definition of aggregating
operator.
2. Let m > 1. Consider the following R: r112 = r
2
21 = rmax; r
1
21 = r
2
12 = rmin;
all other rpij with i 6= j are undefined (Figure A2).
❜ ❜
❜ ❜
X1 X2
X3 Xn· · ·
✲
R(1)
❜ ❜
❜ ❜
X1 X2
X3 Xn· · ·
✛
R(2)
❜ ❜
❜ ❜
X1 X2
X3 Xn· · ·
R(3) = · · · = R(m)
Figure A2. R = (R(1), . . . , R(m)) in the proof of Theorem 4: m > 1.
Every arc (Xi,Xj) designates that r
p
ij = rmax and r
p
ji = rmin.
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In the same way as above, we obtain that any optimal linear order can contain
neither (X1, X2) nor (X2, X1), and the set of optimal orders is empty. Again we
have contradiction with the definition of aggregating operator.
3. We have not covered the case m = 1, n = 2 yet. Here we can only offer the
degenerate proof described in Section 8. If draws (i.e., rpij = r
p
ji) are allowed, this
provides a more sensible proof.
Proof of Theorem 5: Consider any aggregating operator that is indifferent
to the degree of resulting preferences. Assume that it satisfies SCM.
1. Let n > 3. Consider the following R : r113 = r
1
34 = r
1
24 = rmax, r
1
31 = r
1
43 =
r142 = rmin; all other r
p
ij with i 6= j are undefined (Figure A3).
❜
❜ ❜
❜
❜ ❜
X1
X3
X2
X4
X5 Xn· · ·
❄
❍❍❍❍❍❥ ❄
R(1)
❜
❜ ❜
❜
❜ ❜
X1
X3
X2
X4
X5 Xn· · ·
R(2) = · · · = R(m)
Figure A3. R = (R(1), . . . , R(m)) in the proofs of Theorem 5
and Theorem 6: n > 3.
Let ρ be an optimal order for R. Contrasting two alternatives in the manner
described in the formulation of SCM will be called confrontation. Then
(A) Confronting X1 and X4 and using SCM, we get X1≻ρX4.
(B) Confronting X3 and X4 and assuming X4ρX3, we get X3≻ρX1, in
contradiction to (A). Therefore X3≻ρX4.
(C) Confronting X2 and X3, we get X2≻ρX3.
(D) Confronting X1 and X2 and using (B), we get X1≻ρX2.
Thus, it follows from SCM that the restriction of any optimal order to {X1, X2,
X3, X4} is the transitive closure of {(X1, X2), (X2, X3), (X3, X4)}.
Consider the weak order ρ′ that is obtained from ρ by interchanging X1 and
X2. Then for all r
p
ij defined in R, sign(ρ i−ρ j) = sign(ρ
′ i−ρ′ j), and ρ′ is optimal
too, since the operator is indifferent to the degree of resulting preferences by our
assumption. On the other hand, r′ violates SCM (see (D)). This contradiction
proves the desired statement.
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2. n = 3. Consider the following R : r112 = r
1
13 = rmax, r
1
21 = r
1
31 = rmin; all
other rpij with i 6= j are undefined (Figure A4).
❜
❜
❜
X2
X1
X3
 
 ✠
❅
❅❘
R(1)
❜
❜
❜
X2
X1
X3
R(2) = · · · = R(m)
Figure A4. R = (R(1), . . . , R(m)) in the proofs of Theorem 5
and Theorem 6: n = 3.
Let ρ be an optimal order for R. Then using SCM and confronting X1 and
X2, we have X1≻ρX2; confronting X2 and X3, we get X2∼ρX3. On the other
hand, indifference to the degree of resulting preferences implies that the orders
determined by X1≻ρX2≻ρX3 and X1≻ρX3≻ρX2 are optimal too, in contradic-
tion to SCM. The theorem is proved. Finally, note that the latter argument can
be extended to the case n > 3. However, we have preferred to give another proof
for that case, since it demonstrates that indifference to the degree of resulting
preferences allows (in some cases) to set Xj ≻ρXi whereas by SCM, Xi≻ρXj .
Proof of Corollary 1: It suffices to show that these operators are indif-
ferent to the degree of resulting preferences. This is obvious.
Proof of Theorem 6: Assume that one of these operators satisfies SCM.
1. Let n > 3. Consider the following R, the same as in the proof of Theorem 5:
r113 = r
1
34 = r
1
24 = rmax, r
1
31 = r
1
43 = r
1
42 = rmin; all other r
p
ij with i 6= j are
undefined (Figure A3). Let ρ be an optimal order for R. As have been shown in
the proof of Theorem 5, SCM implies that the restriction of any optimal order to
{X1, X2, X3, X4} is the transitive closure of {(X1, X2), (X2, X3), (X3, X4)}.
Consider the weak order ρ′ that is obtained from ρ by interchanging X1 and
X2. Let fk be the objective functions of WQA(R,C
′
k), k ∈ {4, 5, 6} and let fNDW
be the objective function of “Net-Difference-WALB”. Then for R,
f5(ρ) = (ρ 1− ρ 3 + 1)rmax + (ρ 2− ρ 4 + 1)rmax + (ρ 3− ρ 4 + 1)rmax
= (ρ 1 + ρ 2− 2 ρ 4 + 3)rmax = f5(ρ
′);
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f6(ρ) = (ρ 3− ρ 1− 1)rmin + (ρ 4− ρ 2− 1)rmin + (ρ 4− ρ 3− 1)rmin
= (2 ρ 4− ρ 1− ρ 2− 3)rmin = f6(ρ
′);
f4(ρ) = f4(ρ
′) by Theorem 1, and
fNDW(ρ) = 0 = fNDW(ρ
′).
We see that all these operators equalize ρ′ and ρ for R, and thus ρ′ is also
optimal, which contradicts SCM.
2. n = 3. Consider the following R, the same as in the proof of Theo-
rem 5: r112 = r
1
13 = rmax, r
1
21 = r
1
31 = rmin; all other r
p
ij with i 6= j are un-
defined (Figure A4). By SCM, a unique optimal weak order ρ is determined by
X1≻ρX2∼ρX3. On the other hand, each of the four operators under consideration
equalizes ρ and the orders determined by X1≻ρX2≻ρX3 and X1≻ρX3≻ρX2.
Hence they are also optimal, which contradicts SCM. The theorem is proved.
Here the final remark in the proof of Theorem 5 is applicable as well.
Proof of Theorem 7: Let n > 4. Consider the following R : for all
(i, j) ∈ {(k, ℓ) : k, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, k < ℓ} \ {(1, 2), (1, 4), (2, 3)}, r1ij = rmax and
r1ji = rmin; all other r
p
ij with i 6= j are undefined (Figure A5).
Then t1 = t2 = n−3, t3 = n−4, t4 = n−6, and for i = 5, . . . , n, ti = n+1−2i.
Let us prove that for R there exists only one weak order ρ satisfying SCM
and that it is determined by X1≻ρX2≻ρX3≻ρX4≻ρX5≻ρ · · ·≻ρXn. Indeed,
we have the following.
(A) For any i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} and j ∈ {5, . . . , n}, confronting Xi and Xj yields
Xi≻ρXj .
(B) For any i ∈ {5, . . . , n− 1} and j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n}, confronting Xi and Xj
yields Xi≻ρXj .
(C) Confronting X1 and X4, we get X1≻ρX4.
(D) Confronting X2 and X3, we get X2≻ρX3.
(E) Assuming X4ρX3 and confronting X3 and X4, we get X3≻ρX1 in con-
tradiction to (C). Therefore X3≻ρX4.
(F) Confronting X1 and X2 and using (E), we have X1≻ρX2.
Now consider ρ′ determined by X1∼ρ′ X2≻ρ′ X3≻ρ′ X4≻ρ′ · · ·≻ρ′ Xn and let
f(·) be the objective function of the β-LS method. It can be shown that for this
R
f(ρ)− f(ρ′) = 4β2(n− 5).
Therefore, ρ is not uniquely optimal for r = 5 and is not optimal at all for n > 5.
Hence the β-LS method violates Self-Consistency, and the theorem is proved.
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❜ ❜
❜
X1
X3
X2
X4
❜
❜
X5
Xn
qqq
R(2) = · · · = R(m)
Figure A5. R = (R(1), . . . , R(m)) in the proof of Theorem 7. The bold
arrow between two subsets designates that for every Xi in the first subset
and every Xj in the second subset, r
p
ij = rmax and r
p
ji = rmin.
Proof of Theorem 8: Suppose that the conditions of the nonstrict part
of Self-Consistent Monotonicity are satisfied but Xj ≻ρXi, where ρ is the opti-
mal weak order for the generalized row sum method. Consider the ith and jth
equations of (4):
xi =
∑
r
p
ik
∈R′i
((1 + εmn)rpik + ε ·(xk−xi)) +
∑
r
p
ik
∈R′′i
((1 + εmn)rmax + ε ·(xk−xi)),
xj =
∑
r
p
jk
∈R′j
((1 + εmn)rpjk + ε ·(xk−xj)) +
∑
r
p
jk
∈R′′j
((1 + εmn)rmin + ε ·(xk−xj)).
For every rpik ∈ R
′
i, by r
p˜
jk˜
denote the corresponding comparison outcome in
R′j . After subtraction, we get
xi−xj =
∑
r
p
ik
∈R′i
((1 + εmn)(rpik − r
p˜
jk˜
) + ε ·(xk−xk˜) + ε ·(xj −xi))
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+
∑
r
p
ik
∈R′′i
((1 + εmn)rmax + ε ·(xk −xi))
+
∑
r
p
jk
∈R′′j
((1 + εmn)rmax + ε ·(xj −xk)).
Suppose that ε is reasonable and positive. By our assumptions, all terms in the
right-hand side are non-negative, whereas the left-hand side is negative. This con-
tradiction proves that XiρXj. The strict part of Self-Consistent Monotonicity
and Self-Consistency can be proved in the same way.
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